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TAXATION OF REORGANIZATIONS UNDER SECTION 112 (i) (1)
(B) OF THE REVENUE AcT.-Prior to the Revenue Act of 1918 the
federal income tax laws did not contain any provisions expressly
relating to reorganizations of corporations. Although "income" was
defined as a gain derived from capital which had been "severed from
capital" and "received or drawn by recipient for his separate use"
and, "not a growth or increment in value of capital holding," ' later
decisions did not deal liberally with assets acquired through reorgan-
izations. Transfer of stock in one corporation for stock in another
corporation was held to result in a taxable gain to the stockholder
where the assets transferred to the new corporation included accumu-
lated surplus 2 or where the issue of stock was of greater value than
the stock of the transferor corporation.3
The Revenue Act of 1918 4 attempted to relieve those interested
in reorganizations from a profit tax where there was only a change
in corporate form without an actual realization of gain. But under
this statute the court denied stockholders the exemption where the
new stock was in a corporation organized in a foreign state 5 or
where the stock received was of greater par value than that of the
assets transferred, 6 although where stock and cash were issued for
the assets of the old corporation the stock was not considered a gain.7
'Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920).
2United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63 (1921). Where
the assets of a New Jersey corporation were transferred to a Delaware corpo-
tion and the Delaware corporation exchanged at the rate of 2:1 its stock for
that of the New Jersey corporation.
' Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U. S. 176, 42 Sup. Ct. 68 (1921). Old
corporation transferred part of its assets to new corporation in consideration
of entire issue of stock. The stock was immediately issued to the stockholders.
'1Rv. AcT OF 1918, §202 (b), 40 Stat. 1060, 26 U. S. C. A. §1219 (b).
"When in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a
corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities of no greater
aggregate par or face value, * * * the new stock * * * shall be treated as taking
the place of the stock, securities or the properties exchanged."
Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 575 (1925). A cor-
poration was organized in Delaware to take over the assets of a New Jersey
corporation and issued its stock in a ratio of 5 :1. The court held that the
taxpayer acquired interests in a foreign corporation which is subject to different
rights and powers as a corporate organization.
'Insurance and Title Guarantee Co. v. Commissioner, 36 F. (2d) 842 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1929). The difference between the par value and the assets trans-
ferred was considered as a taxable gain to the stockholder.
'Weiss v. Steam, 265 U. S. 242, 44 Sup. Ct. 490 (1924). The cash was
held to be a dividend but the stock was a direct exchange. "We cannot con-
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The Revenue Act of 1921 8 supplemented the Act of 1918 with
a definition of reorganization which "contained some recognition of
the principle that readjustments of corporate forms of reorganization
which did not substantially affect the property interests either of the
shareholders or of the corporations, should, in general, be permitted
to go through without income tax liability." 9 The Revenue Act of
192410 with the purpose of promoting ordinary business transac-
tions 11 allowed for the widest possible latitude in reorganizations by
embracing within the definition of "reorganization" the case of a
transfer of all or part of the assets, if immediately after the transfer
the transferor is in control of the transferee corporation.12 Under
this Act and the subsequent Acts of 192613 and 1928 the government
would not have recognized any gain in the Rockefeller14 and Phellis"5
cases, for the statute provides that:
"No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a
corporation a party to a reorganization are in pursuance of
the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or
securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party
to the reorganization" 18
and, particularly, one of the definitions of reorganization describes
"a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer, the
transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the
corporation to which the assets are transferred." 17
clude that mere change for purposes of reorganization in the technical owner-
ship of an enterprise * * * followed by issuance of new certificates, constitutes
gain separated from the original capital interest" (at 254).
8 42 Stat. 227, 26 U. S. C. A. §934.
'Magill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924 (1924) 24 CoT. L. Rav. 844, 845.
" §203 (c), 43 Stat. 253, 26 U. S. C. A. §934.
"Ways and Means Committee, Rep. No. 179, 6th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No.
8226 (1924) 13. "Congress has heretofore adopted the policy of exempting
from tax the gain from exchange made in connection with a reorganization, in
order that ordinary business transactions will not be prevented, on account of
the provisions of the tax law."
"House Committee on Ways and Means, Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 16 (1924). "The only change in the definition is to include within its
terms the case of a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its
stockholders, or both, are in control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred. This is a common type of reorganization, and clearly should be
included within the reorganization provisions of the statute."
"44 Stat. 9, 109, 110, 26 U. S. C. A. §§934, 935.
"I'Supra note 3.
"Supra note2.
IRav. Ace OF 1928, §112 (b) (3), 45 Stat. 791, 816, 818, 26 U. S. C. A.
§2112 (b) (3).
I Rv. Ac OF 1928, §112 (i) (1) (B), 26 U. S. C. A. §2112 (i) (1) (B).
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and control is defined as
"the ownership of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock
and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of
all other classes of stock of the corporation." 18
Although we confine ourselves to a particular type of reorgan-
ization the statute includes merger or consolidations, 19 recapitaliza-
tion,2 0 or a mere change of identity or form.21 The statutes have
been drawn carefully and in minute details and state exactly how
each step of a reorganization should be treated for tax purposes.22
But whether a particular transaction is a reorganization or a sale,23
or a distribution of dividends 24 has raised a conflict in the courts
that has left experts without any prophecies as to particular situa-
tions.25 It appears, however, that under the definition of reorganiza-
tion-Section 112 (i) (1) (B)-where there is a transfer of either
'
8REv. Acr oF 1928, §112 (j), 26 U. S. C. A. §2112 (j).
19Rzv. Acr OF 1928, §112 (i) (1) (A), 26 U. S. C. A. §2112 (i) (1) (A).
REv. ACT OF 1928, §112 (i) (1) (C), 26 U. S. C. A. §2112 (i) (1) (C).
"'REv. AcT OF 1928, §112 (i) (1) (D), 26 U. S. C. A. §2112 (i) (1) (D).
-Hendricks, Taxation of Reorganizations (1934) 34 Coz. L. REv. 1199.
In a statement published for the use of the House Ways and Means Committee
in the latter part of 1933, Mr. Morgenthau, Acting Secretary of the Treasury,
stated that reorganization provisions "had the disadvantage of leaving the
Department no leeway in the administration of the law."
Cortland Specialty Co. et al. v. Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932). The acquisition of assets for cash and short term securities is a
sale, even though all the assets were transferred. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage
Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 462, 53 Sup. Ct. 257 (1933). Holding under
similar circumstances to the same ruling as in the Cortland case. Prairie Oil
and Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933). Where all the
property was acquired through the purchase of stock, the court treated it as a
sale because of lack of continuity of interest. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Com-
missioner, 28 B. T. A. 106 (1933). Holding that a transfer of all the
assets was not sufficient for a reorganization where control element is lacking.
Watts v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. 148 (1933), similar holding. C. H.
Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). Con-
strued the transaction as a merger where the assets were acquired by fore-
closure in pursuance of a financial plan of reorganization, although there was
no controlling interest in the transferor's stockholders. Rogers v. Strong, 72
F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934). Held, that a transaction in which two cor-
porations acting in consort exchanged their stock for stock in the controlled
corporation, was a sale.
' Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 32 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). Where
the bank corporation's dividends were applied at the request of the stockholders
to the purchase of stock in a corporation created for the purpose of carrying
on a function prohibited to the bank, it was held to be a distribution of divi-
dends, as it was a transfer of stockholders' and not corporate property. Fred
Barker, 28 B. T. A. 657 (1933). Holding that cash and stock distributed in
pursuance of a reorganization is not a liquidating dividend.
6 Hendricks, Definition of Reorganization (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 648,649.
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part or all of the assets to a corporation by an individual,2 6 partner-
ship,27 or one or more corporations, 28 and there is immediate control
of the entire issue of stock 29 by the transferor, there should appar-
ently 3 be a reorganization within the statute.31
In the recent case of Gregory v. Helvering 32 the taxpayer, as
sole stockholder of corporation A, transferred part of the assets
consisting of shares in Z corporation to the B corporation which had
been purposely organized for this transaction, and which issued, in
consideration of the assets, its entire stock to the taxpayer, who
thereupon-within three days--caused the B corporation to be dis-
solved and received as a liquidating dividend the shares in Z corpo-
ration. The taxpayer asserts a "reorganization" and urges that
under Section 112 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 33 "If there is
distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a stock-
holder in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securi-
ties in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the
reorganization, without surrender by such stockholder of stock or
securities in such corporation, no gain 34 to the distributee from the
receipt of such stock or securities shall be recognized" and therefore
she should be taxed only on their value less the cost properly allo-
- T. W. Phillips, Jr., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 3d,
1933). Holding that a transfer by an individual of all of his assets to a
corporation formed to hold such assets was a reorganization and cost of assets
to individual is cost basis to the corporation.
2 Conrad & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
A partnership transferred to a corporation all its assets in exchange for the
entire issue of stock. Reorganization resulted.
' American Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F. (2d) 655, 657
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934). Where two corporations, as transferors, jointly held
control of stock exchanged for assets, the court held that "The statute deals
with a transaction whereby the relation of one or more persons to property is
so changed."
'West Texas Refining & D. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F. (2d) 77, 80 (C.
C. A. 10th, 1933). The outstanding stock was delivered to the transferor, but
at the same time the transferee was under contract to issue stock to a third
party which would limit the transferor's control to 50 per centum. Said the
court, "It is intended to apply to cases where a corporation in form transfers
its property, but in substance it or its stockholders retain the same interest
after the transfer." Here there was no reorganization.
'Cf. Hendricks, Definition of Reorganization (1932) 45 HARV. L. Rlv.
664. "There can never be a transfer of less than substantially all the prop-
erties or assets, unless there is control by the transferor or its stockholders
or both."
'General Consul of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, C. C. M. 1753
(1927). "Again, a transfer of but part of the assets of a corporation can
never of itself result in a reorganization under Sec. 203 (h) (1) (A), but it
does result in a reorganization under Sec. 203 (h) (1) (B) if there is present
an additional element, namely immediate control of' the transferee or its
stockholders, or both."
"69 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), aff'd, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, - U. S. -
(1935).
"'45 Stat. 818, 26 U. S. C. A. §2112 (g).
'Our italics.
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cated. 85 The court held that this transaction was not a reorganization
and the distribution is subject to the surtax on dividends, as "it does
not follow that Congress meant to cover such a transaction, not even
though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of each term used
in the statutory definition," 8 6 although the Eighth Circuit held that
"if a definition of the word is given in the statute, that definition is
controlling." 87 The court agrees that there may be an avoidance 38
of the tax law if the device is carried out by means of legal forms 89
where the element of fraud 40 or concealment 41 in fact is lacking, but
insists that the readjustment must be "undertaken for reasons
germane to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral
incident, egregious to its prosecution." 42 Mr. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, terms the transaction
"an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
corporate reorganization. To hold otherwise would be to exalt
artifice above reality." 43
It is submitted that the court introduced a new factor--inten-
tion 44-into the statute. It is a factor that will not lead to feasible re-
sults 45 and one that supports a conclusion that "In considering exemp-
tions from taxation we should bear against the taxpayer," 46 and that
the "Supreme Court has set up two conflicting lines of decisions re-
l Rv. AcT OF 1928, §115 (c), 26 U. S. C. A. §2115 (c). Cost equals that
proportion of taxpayer's cost of A shares as Z shares bear to entire A assets.
Mince & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 401 (1931); Piedmont Financial
Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 1221 (1932).
'Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 32; J. L. Hand at 810.
Van Weise v. Commissioner, 69 F. (2d) 439, 441 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
"Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916). "When
the law draws a line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the
safe side is none the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full
of what the law permits."
'United States v. Isham, 87 U. S. 496, 506, 17 Wall. 496, 506 (1873). If
the device is in legal form "it is subject to no legal censure." Superior Oil
Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 395, 50 Sup. Ct. 169 (1929). "You may
intentionally go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it" (the line).
'Iowa Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930);
Jones v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 214 (App. D. C. 1934).
"Altizer, Minirnieing Federal Income Taxes (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 106.
"A distinction is made between tax evasion, which implies concealment and is
illegal, and tax avoidance, an open assertion of rights which is not only lawful
but commanded by the dictates of good judgment * * *."
"Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 32, at 811.
'Gregory v. Helvering, - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 268 (1935).
" Cf. Senate Finance Committee, Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser.
No. 8220 (1924) 14. "The intention of the party at the time of the exchange
is difficult to determine, is subject to change by him, and does not represent a
fair basis of determining tax liability."
"Hendricks, Taxation of Reorganizations (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1198,
1208. "If the general proposition of making purpose decisive in every reorgan-
ization case had been presented to it Congress would have had to consider the
vast administrative problems and the great uncertainty that would result from
the enactment of any such rule."
" Insurance & Title Guarantee Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 6, at 844.
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sulting from its inability to arrive at a working rule with regard to the
problem of the corporate entity." 47 Although the statute does not
appear to be in conformity with the ruling in this case it may be
reconciled with a holding that "This section obviously has reference
* * * to a transfer of its entire assets * * * or to a transfer of a part
of the assets * * * that the corporation may thereafter be under one
control and may be operated substantially as one in the prosecution
of his business," 48 and that assets to be exempt from gain must be*
acquired through a reorganization and not through liquidating pro-
ceedings, 49 and that reorganization "indicated readjustments of exist-
ing interests." 50 Again the court may have held in conformance
with prior opinions that "earnings or profits of the original corpora-
tion remain for the purpose of distribution, earnings or profits of the
successor in liquidation" 51 and "tax exemptions are 'never lightly
inferred." 52
Apparently the ruling in the Gregory case appeared too late to
influence the Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means in
its drastic recommendation to repeal all of Section 112 of the Reve-
nue Act in order to stay the tax evasions so prevalent under the
existing reorganization definitions.5 3 An opening attack on reorgan-
ization exemptions is to be found in the exclusion of Section 112 (g)
from the Revenue Act of 1934-the clause under which Gregory
claimed non-recognition of her gain.
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OIL ANG GAs-DEPLETION.-In the first law imposing a tax
upon the net income of corporations there was contained a provision
permitting a deduction from gross income for depreciation of prop-
erty.1 The act by its terms made no provision for a deduction from
"Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax (1935) 44 YALE
L. J. 436, 440. Discussion of the corporate entity in reorganizations.
'Lonsdale v. Commissioner, supra note 24, at 539. Italics our own.
"See Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 2d
1934). Petitioner, a new corporation, issued all of its stock and bonds for the
old corporation's assets and the old corporation dissolved, leaving its sole
stockholder in control of the petitioner. Held, that it was a reorganization as
to petitioner who therefore did not acquire assets in liquidation proceedings.
W Cortland Specialty Co. et al. v. Commissioner, supra note 23, at 939.
Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), at 933.
"Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U. S. 236, 237, 48 Sup. Ct. 80 (1927).
' Preliminary Report of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and
Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 8, 9. Recommends "that the exchange and
reorganization powers contained in Sec. 112 of existing law be abolished. * * *
First it will close the door to one of the most prevalent methods of tax
evasions."
1Cou'omTioN _xcIsE LAW OF 1909, §38, 36 Stat. 112, 113. This act pre-
ceded the Sixteenth Amendment and was held to levy an excise tax, not an
income tax. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911)
(1934) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 228.
